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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

## UNITED STATES ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ENHANCED BRIGADES IN THE FUTURE

BY

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### USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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### the Future

Ву

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ii

### **ABSTRACT**

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The future global environment will still continue to have uncertainty, challenges, and threats to the vital and important interests of the United States. Regional dangers will still be faced with possible large-scale, cross border, attacks against the allies of the United States by hostile states with considerable conventional military power. Additionally, military forces will be required for numerous military operations other than The "Total Army" must be prepared for what will happen between now and 2015 with the best forces available in a fiscally constraint world. This document provides a proposal for restructuring the United States Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades for the Future 2010-2015 and beyond. The Force XXI designs and the Army After Next plans for the future fight are of great concern for our leaders. The Reserve Components must also be prepared for the future.

iv

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstractiii
United States Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades in the
Future 1
Background 2
Current U.S. Army National Guard Enhanced Brigade Structure 9
Technology and the Future Environment
Recommendations 21
Endnotes
Bibliography

### LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure.	1	-Fifteen U.S. Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades 10
Figure	2	-SIMITAR Compressed Gunnery 16
Figure	3	-116 <sup>th</sup> (Armored) ESB Bde Compressed Gunnery Program16
Figure	4	-Information Superiority from Concept to Capabilities 19
Figure	5	-Common Relevant Operational Picture
Figure	6	-Structure of Heavy Combat Group 23
Figure	7	- Current structure of enhanced heavy Brigade 24

### UNITED STATES ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ENHANCED BRIGADES IN THE FUTURE

"During the next two years, I intend for the following tenets to guide the Total Army into the next century. First, the protection of America's vital interests is our number one priority—a seamless Total Force ensures the survival of the nation state. Second, our link to the American people is critical; the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve is the strongest link. Third, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve are must adequately train, our credentials. Leaders support and care 'for soldiers before we place them in harms way. High quality training, combined with first rate equipment, will provide us the synergy we need to outclass any potential opponent. Fourth, necessity compels us to balance the Army imperative—quality is Finally, the Total Force must be first among equals. a seamless force."

- General Dennis J. Reimer

The Total Army concept has evolved since the Vietnam War. In August 1970, Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird expressed the Total Army design in a memorandum to the military services. Two years later his successor, James R. Schlesinger formalized the Total Force concept into policy. After Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams realized the importance of the National Guard and implemented the Total Force Policy. General Abrams realized that the United States Army could not win an extended war without the support of the people. His strategy to create a total Army force was an attempt to insure that the Army was connected to the people. Many discussions, debates, actions,

tensions, and analysis have taken place throughout the past decade over the utilization of United States National Guard Combat units. This paper will also add to the controversial discussion on the roles of United States National Guard units by providing a historical perspective, a review of the current enhanced brigade structure, a discussion of the future technology/environment, and recommendations for the future Enhance Brigade force structure. It is important that America maintain it's military power to insure that our Nation's vital, important, and humanitarian interests are preserved. Our nation is enjoying the benefits of winning the Cold War and will probably not face a major peer competitor that can fight and defeat us on the present day battlefield for at least ten years.

There is a concern that some senior leaders may not take a pro-active or long term view of the future military structure and insure that the United States will have the correct force structure to provide for our continued freedom. An "enhanced" brigade with the correct force structure and with certain constraints is a feasible entity to plan for in the future strategic plans of the United States.

#### BACKGROUND

In December 1998, the United States Army National Guard celebrated its  $362^{\rm nd}$  Birthday. Since the Revolutionary War, the United States Army National Guard has played a vital role in

preserving the Freedom of this Nation. The Militia Acts of 1903 (Dick Act) and 1908 continued to define the Guard role. The Acts provided the first important steps in linking the United States Army and the National Guard.

In World War I, the U.S. Army was manned with less than 200,000 soldiers; however, there were 17 divisions in the United States Army National Guard. General Pershing's World War I policies would have been hard to support without the United States Army National Guard combat forces. The United States Army and National Guard divisions (three of the first five) entry into the war broke the German morale. Following hostilities, the German General Staff named the eight toughest United States Divisions they faced. Six were United States Army National Guard divisions. During the war, Eighty percent of the soldiers were "citizen" soldiers. The United States Army National Guard combat units were essential and effective during this war.

In World War II the 34<sup>th</sup> Division (U.S. Army National Guard) was the first to land overseas. Of the 68 divisions that fought the Japanese and Germans 19 were Guard, 10 were active, and 39 were a mix. The Nation needed the United States Army National Guard to fight the war on two - three fronts (Two Major Theaters of War). The United States Army deployed the Army National Guard divisions first to Europe and the Pacific. By 1944 the

United States Army National Guard had been fighting for more than two years in the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters. This allowed the United States Army to create and train additional divisions to win the war. Again, the United States Army National Guard combat units were essential and effective during this war.

Korea found the United States Army unprepared and not fit to fight. Members of the United States Army National Guard were called upon to be replacements and four United States Army National Guard divisions were mobilized in September 1950. The services of two more divisions were activated in January 1951 and again two more in January 1952. The United States Army National Guard's 40<sup>th</sup> and 45<sup>th</sup> replaced the Army's 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry and 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry divisions in 1952. Again, the United States Army National Guard combat units were essential and effective during this war.

Prior to Vietnam the United States Army National Guard combat units could be and were counted upon to fight the nation's wars when called upon to support the active United States Army. An understanding of the effects the decisions made prior and during the Vietnam War are important to understanding the "Total Army" policy as implemented by General Abrams after the war. President Johnson's failure to mobilize the reserves caused many problems in the reserves. For example, it affected the public support of the war; but also created an atmosphere of

distrust, frustration, and dispirits amongst the trained and dedicated Guardsmen who had spent their careers preparing for mobilization. Not only was the National Guard not mobilized, but now it became a safe-haven for "Draft Dodgers." National Guard readiness declined as a result of this policy and the build-up of the Active component to fight the Vietnam War. When the War ended cutbacks had reduced the active component force to 13 divisions (825,000). The United States Army was now smaller than before the Korean War! General Abrams wanted a sixteen division army with no increase in end strength, he was able to do this by implementing the "roundout' concept. This concept accomplished General Abram's goals of insuring the reserves were called up when the Army had to fight the Nation's battles and to build a sixteen division Army. Colonel Harry G. Summers also stated:

"By returning to the traditional relationship between active and reserve forces—the so-called total army concept—General Abrams had two objectives in mind. First was the reestablishment of the army's capability to deter war, especially in areas critical to United States national security. Equally important to Abrams, however, was the restoration of the traditional linkage between the army and the American people. With the revitalization of the Army Reserve, the citizen-soldier—the centerpiece of American military history could once again act as a bridge between the active army and the American people. 10

General Abrams roundoùt concept was to place one United

States Army National Guard combat brigade in four divisions long

with three newly formed divisions. Each of these divisions would then have one United States Army National Guard brigade and two active component brigades. The reserve would also receive more combat support and combat service support units. With the force cuts and the decreasing Defense budget, this plan would also be more economically feasible. 11 From the 1970 through the 1990 the roundout brigades were changed and had grown to fill out seven of the 18 active divisions. 12 As the National and Military Strategy evolved from a 2  $\frac{1}{2}$  major theaters of war before Vietnam to a 1 ½ major theater of war the total force policy became more important for the active and reserves to win the Cold War. Secretaries of Defense Laird and Weinberger both supported and placed emphasis in the correct mix of active and reserve forces to support the National Security Strategy. From this came the first to fight first to equip Weinberger policy. 13 Additionally, President Reagan administration wanted: "The goal is to choose the least costly form of manpower to perform each function within the DoD, subject to accomplishing the tasks at an acceptable level of proficiency." 14 This increased emphasis and the roundout concept caused the active duty to pay more attention to the equipping, funding, and modernization of the roundout units. 15

Sadly the active United States Army did not use the U.S. Army National Guard roundout brigades during Operation Desert

Shield/Storm. Three United States Army National Guard roundout brigades were mobilized late and never made it into the war.

Much talk, research, and reporting have been done on this subject from the civilian, active, and reserve leadership. It is not the intent of this paper to argue or discussion the many different reasons as to why this happened. The following facts about the roundout brigade are however important:

Roundout brigades were never intended to deploy without at least several weeks of postmobilization training....It was never envisioned, prior to the Persian Gulf War, that a roundout brigade would be able to deploy as part of an immediate response to a no-notice/short-notice, rapid-response contingency." 16

After Desert Storm several projects were started to address the perceived problems found prior, during and after mobilization. First, the Director, Army National Guard established the "Project Standard Bearer" program at the beginning of 1992. The principal focus of this project was to enhance the readiness and capabilities of high priority units to ensure that Army National Guard units were ready and trained to operate with the active Army. Second, a simulation in training for advanced readiness (SIMITAR) program was also established in mid-1992 by Congress. This was an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) project designed to leverage technology in training the United States Army National Guard combat maneuver units. Lastly, during 1992, the active Army implemented a Bold Shift pilot program.

This program had units from all 50 states participating in the active Army's plan to improve Army National Guard readiness through close training relationships between Army National Guard units and their assigned active component partners. The intent of this program was to enhance training relationships and improve the Total Army readiness. 19 Third, the active component involvement in the modernization, oversight, and training of Army National Guard units was improved through the 1993 Defense Appropriations Act - Title  $XI.^{20}$  The Defense Authorization Actof 1993, Title XI, added several qualifying factors to further improve the combat readiness of Army National Guard units. Some of these improvements focused on individual soldier readiness while others focused on unit readiness. For example, military education, leadership training, medical, and dental readiness were central to the improvement in individual readiness for mobilization. Unit training initiatives included: the active army's inspection and review of National Guard training plans, resource and readiness requirements, and the compatibility of National Guard units with the active army units. 21

Since the Desert Storm win, the next important review of our National Security strategy took place after winning the Cold War. In 1993, a bottom-up review was conducted by Secretary of the Army, Les Aspin. "The purpose of the Bottom-Up Review is to define the strategy, force structure, modernization programs,

industrial base, and infrastructure needed to meet new dangers and seize new opportunities."<sup>22</sup> The selected Option, three of the review - Win Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRC) had the Army National Guard providing the active component with about 37 brigades which also included 15 enhanced readiness brigades in order to execute this strategy, provide a strategic reserve, and to support State authorities.<sup>23</sup> Maintaining combat units in the Army National Guard was an important aspect of the bottom-up review, the Total Force concept, and later the National Security and Military Strategies.

# CURRENT U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ENHANCED BRIGADE STRUCTURE

"Enhanced" Brigade? You may be wondering what in the world does this mean. Webster defines enhance as: "To increase or make greater, as in value, cost, beauty, or reputation; augment:

. . . See Synonyms at improve." The United States Army

National Guard has fifteen brigades that were selected to be enhanced. These brigades are composed of seven light, five mechanized, two armored, and one armored cavalry regiment Figure 1). 24 Some of the brigades selected had previously been

"Roundout" or "Roundup" brigades to active U.S. Army component divisions. The enhanced separate Brigades (ESBs) are relatively new within the U.S. Army National Guard organization. The



'Figure 1 -Fifteen U.S. Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades

selected brigades must reach certain readiness goals prior to 1 October 1999. These goals are measured by the unit status report areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. The term enhanced generally refers to resources. The enhanced brigades receive priority after tier one and two units within the National Guard appropriated resources. Specifically, resources are applied to certain functional areas to improve the unit status ratings. As

stated earlier, the objective is for all enhanced brigades to reach the highest ratings in all areas except training by 1 October 1999. Likewise, the training Rating in the units should reflect a level three rating (one being the highest and four being the lowest).

The structure of the enhanced brigade is based somewhat upon an active component separate brigade. Commanded by a Brigadier General the enhanced brigade consists of approximately 4100 soldiers. The brigade is generally organized with three combat maneuver battalions, an engineer battalion, a field artillery battalion, a ground cavalry troop, a military intelligence company, a support battalion (note that this battalion is neither a forward support battalion nor a main support battalion as found in divisions), and a headquarters and headquarters company (military police, air defense, chemical, and signal platoons, normal staff officers plus S-5, Inspector General, and judge advocate sections).

### TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT

As discussed earlier simulation in training for advanced readiness (SIMITAR) program is one of the first programs that was established in mid-1992 by Congress as an Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) project in attempt to leverage technology in training the U.S. Army National Guard combat maneuver units.

The design of this program was to use technology to achieve a compounding effect in the training readiness of U.S. Army

National Guard combat units. Technologies would focus on simulations and exercises to improve training strategies and readiness. With 39 days in which to train the core unit, the desire was to make the best use of these days along with additional days to accomplish an increase in readiness through low cost, time saving innovations in training. It is important to remember that these additional days include the 60-90 days that the leadership in a unit uses for training. The goals were:

"• Development of low-cost simulators, simulations and exercises that enable small unit collective training locally and on demand. • Development of opportunities to learn and practice brigade and battalion staff battlefield synchronization skills locally and on demand. • Development of opportunities for combat service support (CSS) units and individuals to practice their skills locally. • Development of more objective measure of performance. <sup>28</sup>

The SIMITAR program used the technologies from off-the-shelf purchases when possible along with unique strategies to achieve the desire training improvements within the selected brigades.

Some of the staff training systems used are highlighted below:

JANUS - Named after two-faced god who guarded gates of Rome.

Symbolizes both Red and Blue forces operation. Central server with 20 terminals for crew through brigade level computerized

tactical training on accurate map databases. This system was designed initially to assist National Guard commanders and staff with synchronization training at their armories. BSTS - Battle Staff Training System; trains staff officers in individual knowledge skills and synchronization, computer managed - uses Field Manuals. PENCIL - Pen-based Electronic Network for Command Information Linking.

AFIST - Abrams Full-crew Interactive Simulation Trainer. This system attaches to stations on Abrams tanks and provides full-crew training in simulated gunnery, driving and command. The BFIST - Bradley Full-crew Interactive Simulation Trainer system was developed due to the great results obtained from the AFIST.

ARSI - ARPA Reconfigurable Simulator Initiative; trains Bradley platoons and companies. Can be reconfigured to simulate Abrams, Bradley, or HUMMV, allowing virtual maneuver capability. SIMNET - Simulation Network; trains armor platoons and companies in maneuver. DFIRST - Deployed force-on-force Instrument Range System - this system is low cost alternative to MILES 2000.

Other devices used to train individuals are: EST 
Engagement Skills Trainer; trains dismounted infantry squads;

the VMAT - Virtual Realty Maintenance Training Simulator which

trains maintenance soldiers in simplified test equipment and

internal combustion engines. Virtual reality allows soldiers to

"see" and manipulate engine components. The TMT - Triage

Medical Trainer (VOMIT - Voice Operated Medical Interactive

Trainer). This system uses voice recognition software to train.

91B military occupational specialty (MOS) in trauma assessment.

It accurately simulates a variety of injuries and forces medics

to triage injured soldiers.<sup>29</sup>

Some newer devices are the FSCATT - Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer which consists of three training subsystems: Howitzer Crew Trainer (HCT) (a simulated M109A5 or M109A6 howitzer turret); Collective Training Control Subsystem (CTCS) (permits FSCATT to interface internally and externally and will enable the training and assessment of the battery Fire Direction Center); and the Forward Observer Trainer (GUARDFIST II/IIA) (Guard Unit Armory Device Full Interactive Simulation Trainer). The GUARDFIST II training device is a portable training system designed to simulate battlefield scenarios for the training of Field Artillery Forward Observers (FOs). Most of the systems being developed will tie into the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT) which allows indirect fire support to the Synthetic Theater Of War (STOW). Additionally, the systems such as BFIST, AFIST, and FSCATT will interact with the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). These systems can work along or be connected into other devices or systems to support collective training.30

A simple example of the results from these technologies is demonstrated in the 116<sup>th</sup> Cavalry (Armored) enhanced Brigade's results from their annual training in 1995-1997. Normally during annual training most of the training time is spent either completing the annual tank table VIII gunnery requirements or conducting maneuver training. The SIMITAR technology and strategies allows Army National Guard soldiers to train in both gunnery and maneuver skills in a given training year (Figures 2-3).<sup>31</sup> It is important to note that this is only a single, simple step in what the future will hold for training and more importantly for what technology can be expected to produce.

Technology in the future will allow for the "Near Perfect Situational Awareness". This will insure that the brigade commander sees himself, sees the enemy, sees the other friendly forces, and sees his assets. Some of this technology is here now within the Force XXI units and was tested during the Army Warfighter Experiment. In fact according to the Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States Army: "... will also accelerate its Force XXI modernization plan, which will revolutionalize (emphasis added) combat capability by enhancing battlefield awareness (emphasis added) through modern information technology." Desert Shield/Storm showed what technology, at that time, could do. The use of the then new technology such as the stealth fighters, smart/precision guided




Figure 2 -SIMITAR Compressed Gunnery




Figure 3 -116<sup>th</sup> (Armored) ESB Bde Compressed Gunnery Program

bombs, airborne surveillance, real time communications and pictures, patriot missiles, space-base sensors, and cruise missiles demonstrated technology and it's capability to influence future battles. Future technology will also improve the performance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's), satellite reconnaissance, intelligence, communications capabilities, development of directed energy weapons, and the further increase in the precision capabilities of army, air, and navy munitions. Additionally, the revolution in air and space power will insure the United States continued air superiority in future battles. 33

"The synergy of improved intelligence and surveillance, accurate navigation, precision targeting and weapons delivery, and reliable real-time communications greatly improved survivability; and the availability of a variety of delivery means has fundamentally changed the character of warfare in and from air and space." 34

With this imagined and unimagined increase in technology the abilities of commanders to see themselves (friendly capability) and the enemy will be immeasurable. Mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T) will not only be more readily available to brigade commander, but new technology will assist the commander in the difficult tasks of synchronizing his battlefield operating systems to achieve synergic effects on the battlefield. "In the Information Age, the United States is in the forefront of exploiting modern information technology to harness the explosive potential of

rapid dissemination and use of information."<sup>35</sup> These technological advances will help the commander and his staff visualize the battlefield and communicate freely to his subordinate the appropriate actions needed to defeat the enemy on the battlefield as quickly and with the least amount of casualties as possible for any given situation.

"Battlefield visualization is the process whereby the commander—

- Develops a clear understanding of his current state in relation to the enemy and environment.
- $\bullet$  Envisions a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment.
- ullet Visualizes the sequence of activity that will move his forces from its current state to its end state."  $^{36}$

Under Joint Vision 2010 technology and concepts such as: comprehensive battlefield, fused battlespace sustainment, Synchronized Joint Operations with Allies, collaborative planning systems, common operational picture (figure 4), and combat identification are all enablers for full spectrum dominance. The future capabilities of the military will include the technology that allows for smaller high tech forces to easily deploy, synchronize, command and control, and defeat the enemy during a limited time period with reduced casualties (figure 5).<sup>37</sup>




Figure 4 -Information Superiority from Concept to Capabilities




Figure 5 -Common Relevant Operational Picture

With the technologies available at the joint level the brigade and lower commanders will surely have the abilities to do what a joint commander wants and more.

The future global environment will still continue to have uncertainty, challenges, and threats to the vital and important interests of the United States as well as those interests of the United States Allies. The United States will continued to face a larger number of serious challenges to our security between now and the year 2015. Regional dangers will still be faced with possible large-scale, cross border, attacks against the Allies of the United States by hostile states with considerable conventional military power. Iran and Iraq will continue to be a threat to their neighbors. Oil will continue to be a valuable resource for the United States through 2015. The unimpeded flow of oil from this area will be of interest to the countries in that region and the United States. North Korea will continue to be a threat to the countries in the region. Their aggressive military capabilities across the border from South Korea and their inevitable economic collapse threaten the countries and stability in that region.

Additionally, military operations will be required for numerous operations similar to Somalia for those countries that are failing now or will fail in the future creating conflict or humanitarian crisis that will be of interest to the United

States or it's Allies. Other threats will include: proliferation of advanced weapons technologies, weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers, threats to United States homeland, unconventional or asymmetric attacks, and wild card scenarios. The United States must keep a military capable to deal with the global security environment now and for the future. 38 Lastly, the military must be prepared for what will happen between now and 2015 with the best forces available in a fiscally constraint world. "Between now and 2015, it is reasonable to assume that more than one aspiring regional power will have both the desire and the means to challenge U.S. interests militarily." 39

### RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Army must prepare future forces to defeat the enemy in many different scenarios. As we continue in the future, as so in the recent past, it must be expected that future plans will be constrained by military spending. 40 Additionally, if the future holds that a trisected global security system develops where the tier one nation-state economies are based upon information, Tier two are industrial based economies, and tier three are rogues states then the military must be prepared to fight across these tier levels of threats or capabilities. The United State Army National Guard combat units are one of the strategic and cost effective

elements left for the United States Army to resource, maintain, and train to fight the current threats and against tier two and three nation-states in the future trisected global system. 41 Furthermore, the enhanced brigade structure of the future could be used against tier one nation states if properly structured and resourced. With the imagined and unimagined technology of the future, the commander will have the ability to project his forces quickly, with near perfect situational awareness, and flawless communications to defeat enemy forces by land.

Landpower, as shown throughout history, will continue to be the key to decisive battle and to our military strategy to shape, respond, and prepare. The United States will continue to have the air and sea superiority to dominate the enemy, but they will not be able to defeat him without land forces. 42

"Thus, the question is not whether American landpower is essential to American strategic dominance. The question is how landpower should be organized to operate jointly with airpower and seapower to preserve America's strategic dominance in the next century."

Landpower will continue to be essential to American.

The United States military however, should expect that the American people would not support any large increases in the Department of Defense discretionary budget during a peacetime environment. Competing demands such as social security, health care, and environmental problems will certainly take priority over increases in spending on the defense. More importantly,

the "Total Army" will continue to have trouble obtaining and retaining quality soldiers when the economy is doing fair to good. With this in mind it is important that U.S. Army National Guard enhanced separate brigade are resourced, structured, and trained similar to the United States Army Force XXI units. a light and a heavy enhanced brigade should receive the technology that the Force XXI units have and be allowed to test the Force XXI concepts within a Force XXI United State Army National Guard enhanced brigades. Moreover, the ideas espoused by Douglas A. Macgregor in Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century should be incorporated when structuring this digital enhanced brigade. The author of this book provides some excellent examples of a unique structure for "Combat Groups". The structure of these combat groups compares closely to that of an enhanced separate brigade (figure 6 and 7).




Figure 6 -Structure of Heavy Combat Group




Figure 7 - Current structure of enhanced heavy brigade

The units found within the C4I battalion are of extreme importance to the design of the enhanced brigade. Douglas Macgregor recommends that the C4I battalion be composed as shown below:

- "•GROUP HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (INCLUDES AG COMPONENT, MEDICAL AND SUPPORTING MAINTENANCE ASSETS)
- •NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT (NLOS) BATTERY. (INCLUDES UAVS AND OVER THE HORIZON ATTACK SYSTEMS)
- •INFORMATION WARFARE COMPANY. (INCLUDES INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, JAMMING ANALYSIS, CHEMICAL DETECTION CAPABILITY)
- •AIR DEFENSE BATTERY. (SHORT RANGE TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS)
- •COMMAND AND CONTROL COMPANY. (COMMUNICATIONS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT DISPERSED, HIGHLY MOBILE COMBAT GROUP)
- •CHEMICAL CO: INCLUDES CHEMICAL RECON AND LIMITED DECONTAMINATION CAPABILITY
- •MILITARY POLICE SECURITY DETACHMENT. (INCLUDES SUFFICIENT MANPOWER AND FIREPOWER TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR C2 NODES AND SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS."45

The enhanced brigade structure does have a military police platoon, chemical platoon, and an ADA platoon within the HHC. An ADA battery is replacing the ADA platoon in the near future. Furthermore, the Headquarters has a judge advocate, inspector general, and public affairs sections. As can be seen there would be very little structure changes to provide for a unique National Guard Army enhanced brigade to fight future. The addition of a C4I Battalion to the current structure would be relatively easy. Within the brigade (Group) headquarters company the judge advocate, inspector general, and public affairs sections should be added.

The resources needed for the enhanced brigade with the correct components, technology, and capabilities of the digital force XXI design would certainly be costly. Failure to provide the required resource to test the viability of this structure and equipment could be critical considering the continued pressures placed on the military to do more with less. A United States Army National Guard enhanced brigade resourced with digital equipment, structured with a C4I battalion, and with the technology that provides near perfect situational awareness when the air and sea are controlled would certainly by a feasible asset that is combat effective, efficient, and deployable.

Synchronization of the battlefield operating systems would be easier with the new technology that will provide the

commander with the situational awareness needed to make decisions and affect the battlefield. A test needs to be conducted similar to the Force XXI test for the National Guard enhanced brigades to validate the future structure of these units. The enhanced brigade is very similar to the combat groups recommended by the <u>Breaking the Phalanx: A New design for Landpower in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century</u> author who ideas for the future combat forces have validity.

One Team, One Fight, One Future key themes for the integration within the Total Army are:

- "• Readiness is nonnegotiable. Our ...
- $\bullet$  The Reserve components are our strongest link to the American people. The ...
- Total Army leadership is essential. The ...
- We must change. Our ...
- The Army has bold new Ideas. The ... "46

The themes of change and bold new ideas would be a fitting characterization for United States Army National Guard enhanced brigade structure of the Future. The enhanced brigades must change in structure to handle the bold new ideas and technology of the future environment. If the future is a seamless, integrated force as recommended by General Reimer, then the change to fully integrate command and control and digital systems along with organization must happen now to allow the

United States Army National Guard brigades to gain the technological edge of the future.

Word Count: 4992

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